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Abstract
China?s rural land transfer policy has changed dramatically over the past several decades. The policy process is 
not linear, but is defined by the dual and contrasting characteristics of stability and dramatic change. This paper 
introduces punctuated-equilibrium theory as a critical lens to examine China?s rural land transfer policy in the 
process of urbanization, and finds that the interaction of policy venue and policy image are the main factors caus-
ing dramatic changes. China is a transitional country and the needs of farmers and shifts from local practice to 
central decision-making as well as policies related to land transfer should be taken into consideration in the con-
text of policy venues. Social environment, development strategy and policies side effects all have an important im-
pact on the policy image.
Keywords： Rural Land Transfer Policy; Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory; Policy Venue; Policy Image; Land-Use 
Right; China
Introduction
China?s dual land tenure system is defined as land 
ownership separate from land-use rights. Based on 
the Constitution of People?s Republic of China (PRC), 
land in the cities is owned by the state, while land in 
the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives, 
except for those portions belonging to the state in ac-
cordance with the law. The Household Responsibility 
System (HRS) was established in 1978 to allow for 
the distribution of arable land to individual farming 
households through contracting with the village col-
lective. Under the current land tenure system, rural 
land transfer is short for land management contractu-
al rights transfer, however the scope of rural land 
transfer can further narrowed by the usage of the 
land. Rural land is defined as cultivated land, forestry 
land, grassland, and land for other agricultural uses 
as stipulated in the Rural Land Contracting Law 
(RLCL). The RLCL also includes several principles in 
the rural land transfer, including: provisions that col-
lective ownership of agricultural land cannot be 
changed; exercising equal consultation, voluntari-
ness, making compensation; the nature of the con-
tracted land and its use for agriculture shall not be al-
tered; and the term for the circulated contract shall 
not exceed the surplus of the duration of the contract 
already concluded. According to related laws and 
regulations, rural land transfer can be defined as a 
market behavior to transfer or transact the use right 
of agricultural land without changes in usage within 
an effective contracting period.
The past 35 years in China?s rural land polices in-
cludes prohibited phase, permitted phase and en-
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couraged phase. The policy process is not a linear 
evolution, but defined by the dual and contrasting 
characteristics of stability and dramatic change. For a 
time, public policy research was dominated by incre-
mentalism, which describes policy as a smooth pro-
cess with marginal or incremental accommodation. 
In China?s case, however, incrementalism can no 
longer be adopted. Land transfer policy over the past 
35 years has been experienced at least three times in 
dramatic changes or punctuations. Dynamics, rather 
than statics, characterized this area. Thus, this paper 
introduces an appropriate punctuated-equilibrium 
model to explore the causes of China?s rural land 
transfer policy changes.
Theoretical Perspective: Punctuated-Equi-
librium Theory
Over the years, various studies have produced the-
ories regarding policy progress. The approaches of 
these studies fall into two categories: (1) stages heu-
ristic approach based on the principal of incremental-
ism; and (2) non-linear evolution policy process ap-
proach, consisting of separate theory models, such 
as the punctuated-equilibrium theory. Until the mid-
1980s, the most influential framework for understand-
ing the policy process, particularly among American 
scholars, was the stages heuristic. It is the most dom-
inate approach in public policy research field of Chi-
na, as well. The stages approach outlines policy-mak-
ing as a linear problem solving process that is 
rational, balanced, objective, and analytical.1 In the 
stages approach, large-scale departures from past 
policies and dramatic changes in policies cannot be 
understood and explained. While both stability and 
changes are important elements of the policy pro-
cess, scholars propose a second nonlinear theory pol-
icy process approach to encompass both. 
Punctuated-equilibrium was initially advanced as 
an explanation of the development among species, or 
speciation.2 Rather than changing smoothly and slow-
ly like the Darwinian models, evolution and specia-
tion were characterized as near-stasis, punctuated by 
large-scale extinctions and replacements. Similar re-
placements are also displayed in policy processes. 
Authors Baumgartner and Jones analyzed a variety of 
U.S. policy-making cases over time and found that in-
teraction between policy image and policy venue ex-
acerbated punctuations. Policy image is defined as 
understanding and discussing a policy. It is a mixture 
of empirical information and emotive appeals. Policy 
venue is the institutional locations where authorita-
tive decisions are made concerning a given issue.3 
The interaction between policy image and policy 
venue can be divided into policy subsystems and 
macro politics. Typically, issues are handled in paral-
lel within subsystems and within their communities 
of experts. However, parallel processing does not 
rule out change, but allows for a politics of adjust-
ment with incremental change resulting from bar-
gaining among interests and marginal moves in re-
sponse to changing circumstances. When dominated 
by a single interest, a subsystem is the best policy 
monopoly with fewer changes. Yet, policy monopolies 
are not infinitely secure, they can be constructed and 
collapse. Due to non-monopoly interest group?s prop-
aganda or other reasons, the citizens or governmen-
tal institutions may change their attitudes towards 
one issue, from indifferent to intervene actively. With 
the intervention of new policy participants, the for-
mer issue is refined and asked for changes. 
As pressure for change builds and support for poli-
cy image grows, a new dimension of the debate be-
comes more salient with the parallel processing and 
subsystem broken down. Refined issues are raised to 
serial processing system in the context of macro po-
litical by newly established interests. When an issue 
area is present on the macro political agenda, small 
changes in the objective circumstances can cause 
large changes in policy. Baumgartner and Jones refer 
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to this situation as positive feedback. Negative feed-
back maintains stability in a system, most evident in 
parallel processing with subsystems, while positive 
feedback exacerbates impulses for change. This over-
comes inertia and produces explosions or implosions 
from former states.4 At this point, policy change oc-
curs and new policies for institutional structures are 
created. The policy system is then returned to its 
equilibrium until the next unpredictable change.
The Evolution of China’s Rural Land Trans-
fer Policy After 1978
Prior to the Communist Party of China (CPC) com-
ing into power, the political party gained support for 
a revolution with the promise of land for farmers with 
little or no land of their own. After the founding of 
New China in 1949, CPC continued to allocate mas-
sive rural land to tenant farmers by the land-to-tiller 
programs in order to gain their support for the new 
regime. In the early years of the new nation, private 
individuals owned both the land and the use rights. 
In the mid-1950s, the collectivization campaign was 
launched and individual farming was prohibited. 
Land ownership shifted from private ownership to 
public ownership, meaning ownership and use right 
were both charged by the People?s Communes. In 
1978, several peasants signed a contract with local 
cadres who secretly allowed them to farm in Xiao-
gang Village in Anhui province. The secret experi-
ment proved to be very successful. In spite of this, 
the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Com-
mittee of the Communist expressly opposed Mao?s 
communes by encouraging the spread of HRS; the 
system was adopted officially after leader Deng 
Xiaoping openly praised these experiments in 1980. 
To Further Strengthen and Improve Several Prob-
lems of Agricultural Production Responsibility Sys-
tem was issued by the CPC in September 1980 and 
affirmed production concentrated to each household. 
HRS policy has rapidly expanded since then and indi-
vidual farming households were granted land-use 
rights to ensure their sustained interest in farming 
and its related investments. 
Although village collective allocated land-use rights 
to individual households via contract under HRS, 
land transfer remained illegal. In the 1982 Constitu-
tion, Article 10 stated that no organization or individ-
ual might appropriate, buy, sell, lease land, or other-
wise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful 
means. In addition, Article 80 of General Principles of 
the Civil Law regulated that land may not be sold, 
leased, mortgaged, or illegally transferred by any 
other means. In 1986, the Supreme People?s Court?s 
judicial interpretation regarding contract disputes of 
rural land ruled that transfer agreements were inva-
lid without the contract-issuing party?s permission. 
The issuing party, namely the village collective in-
cluding collective economic organizations and village 
committees, is the owner of rural land. During this 
period, land management contractual rights were 
partial or limited because farmers did not have the 
ability to use the rights as they saw fit. Farmers 
viewed rural land as the only productive resource to 
make a living, rather than an asset. Economist Her-
nando de Soto referred to the agricultural land that 
has been greatly depressed because of the insecurity 
of land rights and legal restraints as dead capital5.? 
In 1984, the No. 1 document was issued by the cen-
tral government and permitted rural land transfer, 
under certain conditions, for the first time. At the be-
ginning of HRS, the land contract was from two years 
to three years, causing frequent land adjustments. 
This document of 1984 urged local officials to pro-
long the contractual term of land-use rights and avoid 
unnecessary adjustments. Meanwhile, farmers who 
turned to non-agriculture business or were not able 
to cultivate land could transfer their contracted land 
to others if approved by the village committee. With 
the rural-urban labor migration, No. 1 central docu-
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ment of 1986 encouraged farmers to transfer small 
arable lands to big grain production households to 
cultivate appropriate scale agricultural production. 
Though land transfer was mentioned in these two 
policy documents, the legitimacy of agricultural land 
transfer was not officially acknowledged until April 
1988 in the constitutional amendment Article 10. The 
amendment stated that the right to land use could be 
transferred according to law. However, at that time, 
other means of circulation, such as lease and transfer, 
were banned, except subcontract. The report of 
Third Plenary Session of the 14th CPC Central Com-
mittee indicated that the use term could be extended 
for an additional 30 years after the 15-year term re-
ferred to in the 1984 document had expired. In addi-
tion, the contract and management rights of explora-
tion programs could be inherited and rural land-use 
rights could be transferred with compensation. In 
1994, lease, exchange, and other means were admit-
ted by the central government in the Document No. 
16. 
In 2001, the Notice Concerning Rural Contracted 
Land Transfer (Document No. 18) claimed that land 
transfer was the objective requirement for rural de-
velopment. Following this, the Ministry of Agricul-
ture issued a document reemphasizing land transfer 
as significant to protecting farmers? rights, promoting 
the development of agriculture and rural economy, 
and maintaining rural social stability. Additionally, the 
report of the 16th Party Congress indicated that 
where conditions permitted, the transfer of the con-
tractual right of land could be carried out according 
to law and on a voluntary and compensatory basis to 
develop systematic scale operations. From 1984 to 
2002, land transfer was legitimized in China and farm-
ers could rent, exchange, or subcontract their land 
for efficient production. 
In 2003, the Rural Land Contracting Law was is-
sued by the central government and laid the legal 
foundation for land transfer, establishing the rural 
land transfer institution. On March 1, 2005, Regula-
tions on Transfer of Rural Land Management was is-
sued by the Chinese Agricultural Ministry, which 
was more detailed than previous laws. Following this, 
Chinese local governments established different agri-
cultural land transfer systems pursuant to their situa-
tions. Three years later, the Decision of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China on Sev-
eral Big Issues on Promoting the Reform and Devel-
opment of Rural Areas was issued by the Third Plena-
ry Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee, and 
suggested a need to take further steps to establish, 
perfect, and strengthen land contract management 
transfer to develop appropriate-scale management. 
This document encouraged the development of pro-
fessional investors, family farms, farmer?s coopera-
tives, and other main-scale operations, if conditions 
permitted.
The No. 1 central document of 2009 stated that vol-
untary and remunerative principles would be upheld 
and the leading role of farmers in land circulation 
would be respected. Localities with the appropriate 
conditions were encouraged to develop circulation 
service organizations to provide services to both 
transfer sides on information exchange, legal consul-
tation, price evaluation, contracting, and the settle-
ment of disputes. Moreover, the Law on the Media-
tion and Arbitration of Rural Land Contract Disputes, 
issued in 2010, provided legal safeguards to settle 
disputes over contracted management of rural land, 
maintaining the legitimate rights, and interests of the 
parties. 
As a prerequisite of the protection of farmer?s land-
use right, household registration system was stressed 
in the No. 1 central document of 2013. It emphasized 
the need to process the registration and certification 
of land-use right over the next five years. That same 
year, a reform master plan approved by the Third Ple-
nary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee 
promised to give rural residents more property 
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rights and allow the sale, lease, and demutualization 
rural construction land, with a number of restrictions. 
During this period, land would be no longer be a 
means of production, but become a farmer?s main as-
set to possess and transact. For farmers, land man-
agement contractual rights became more credible af-
ter receiving written documentation.
Causes for Changes in China’s Rural Land 
Transfer Policy
Authors Baumgartner and Jones argue that the 
punctuated-equilibrium theory of public policy is 
driven by two interacting forces: (1) the institutional 
context of issues (policy venues); and (2) how issues 
are portrayed (policy image). Following the reform, 
China?s rural land transfer policy consisted of three 
phases: (1) prohibited phase (1978–1984); (2) permit-
ted phase (1984–2002); and (3) encouraged phase 
(2002–present). The changes from one phase to an-
other can be explained by the interaction of policy 
venues and policy images. 
Policy Venues in a Transitional Country
Policy venues focus on institutions or groups in so-
cieties that have the authority to make policy deci-
sions. The categories and forms of policy venues 
were on state forms. American federalism creates a 
number of distinct and partially autonomous venues 
for policy action. In the United States, decisions are 
made by Congress, executive branch officials, the 
courts, local government, private investors through 
the stock and bond markets, businessmen, and by 
consumers. In China, under the unitary political sys-
tem, policy issues became closely associated with 
particular levels of government or institutional ven-
ues. Using land policy as an illustration, the Chinese 
Communist Party Congress is the party and nation?s 
real policymaking institution. The National People?s 
Congress, the organization of supreme power, exer-
cises the legislative power of the state to enact land 
management laws as well as other laws concerning 
land issues. The Ministry of Land and Resources of 
the People?s Republic of China is responsible for the 
protection and rational utilization of natural resourc-
es, such as land, mineral, and marine resources. At 
the local level, China established sub-provincial (not 
including province level) vertical management sys-
tem, namely a land management agency of a town (or 
district) is the county (or city?s) land management 
resident agency. Sub-county (or city) level govern-
ment is empowered to create their overall plans for 
land utilization but to submit it to the upper level gov-
ernment for approval.
The types of policy venues are limited and concen-
trated under a unitary system. It is not commonplace 
to see issue assignment shifts from executive agen-
cies to congressional control under China?s political 
system. Furthermore, the shifts between different 
policymaking institutions and the shifts driven by 
public attention from subsystems to macro politics 
are difficult to identify. China is historically a large 
agricultural country and by 2012, there were more 
than 650 million people living in rural areas. Agricul-
ture, rural development, and farmers (three rural is-
sues) are always among the top concerns of the Chi-
nese Government. As one indispensible part of these 
issues, rural land policy has been maintained in the 
political macro-level since the establishment of HRS. 
No. 1 central document refers to the first policy docu-
ment of a year, issued by the CPC and the State 
Council, the Cabinet. The first No. 1 central docu-
ments were issued from 1982 to 2014 and contained 
16 documents targeting rural issues. The No. 1 cen-
tral document of 2014 stated that China should deep-
en rural land system reform and improve rural gov-
ernance.
Although the context shifts of punctuated-equilibri-
um theory are not evident under China?s unitary sys-
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tem and government-led economic development pat-
tern, it cannot be denied that there is movement from 
local governments to central governments in the evo-
lution of policy. Rural land transfer has emerged 
spontaneously since the implementation of HRS in 
1982. HRS distributed farmland to individual house-
holds equally based on the degree of soil quality, 
which may cause one household have several scat-
tered lands. Farmers exchanged their contractual 
land in private to integrate their lands and cultivate 
more easily. Driven by the needs of farmers, the cen-
tral government allowed land transfer within collec-
tive organizations under several specific circumstanc-
es in 1984. 
China?s reform demonstrates the Chinese charac-
teristics of individualism and experimentalism. In the 
early stages of reform, rural land transfer was not ad-
mitted or encouraged. For a time, most farmers 
transferred their land-use right via oral contract 
based on trust without written agreements or legal 
procedures with the means of circulation not clear. A 
number of farmers did sign contracts; however, the 
contractual format and content were not legal, lead-
ing to many land disputes. In fact, as early as 1987, 
the central government set up experimental areas of 
rural reform in the No. 5 document. Afterwards, 
Jiangsu, Nanhai, Pindu, and other provinces or cities 
were selected and assigned with different experimen-
tal themes, with 21 pilot sites. Similar to the role of 
Shenzhen in the first stage of reform, these local ex-
perimental areas were aimed at providing experienc-
es and references for the central government to 
make decisions; they also spread the unknown risk of 
the rural reform. Although these reform experiments 
were at the local level and mainly instructed by local 
governments, the successes were written into the 
policy documents and laws on the central level. For 
example, Meitan city, located in the Guizhou Prov-
ince, was selected as the first experimental area for 
rural land reform. It developed the basic principle of 
Rural Land Contract System that in order to maintain 
existing land contract relationships over the long-
term, collectives do not add newly contracted land to 
added populations or take away old contracted land 
from decreasing populations. This principle was 
adopted by the central government and added to the 
Law on the Contracting of Rural Land in 2002. Meit-
an, Nanhai, Chengdu, and Chongqing also shaped 
their own land transfer model. 
Related policies such as HRS can also be regarded 
as policy venues. Land-use rights includes separating 
the ownership and is the prerequisite to the land 
management contractual right transfer, namely, land 
transfer policy relied on the land ownership policy. In 
the early years of new China, rural lands were owned 
by individual farmers who had the right to transact or 
transfer their lands. After 1956, rural land became 
publicly owned and the land-use rights were dictated 
by the People?s Communes. In 1978, HRS was secret-
ly created by peasants in Xiaogang Village; it did not 
spread nationwide. In the landmark document of re-
form policy issued in 1978, HRS was banned by ex-
plicit order. Opponents based on the principles of two 
whatever?s6 regarded HRS as a product of capitalist 
private ownership that damaged socialist public own-
ership of the means of production. It was not until the 
No. 1 central document was issued in 1982 that HRS 
was officially permitted, with land management con-
tractual rights as an outcome. Therefore, it was not 
unusual that land transfer use rights were banned in 
the early stages of reform.
Punctuated–equilibrium theorists studied a num-
ber of issues, including nuclear power, urban prob-
lems, smoking, and car safety, to test their theories 
under a federal state. China is a transitional and uni-
tary state and local governments and related policies 
should be considered in the context of policy venues. 
Under government-led economic development pat-
tern and single-party political system, the ruling par-
ty, rather than the media, executive branch officials, 
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and other institutions are the primary policymakers. 
Moreover, as a component of the three rural issues, 
rural land policy was related to the party and coun-
try?s survival. Rural land transfer policy has been 
dominated the macro-political system, but local gov-
ernments in experimental areas will be empowered 
to make policy decisions according to their own con-
ditions. As a result, central government may change 
the policy based on the experiments and lessons 
learned from local experiments. 
Policy Images as Portrayed by Social Envi-
ronment and Development Strategy
Policy images may be accepted or rejected, de-
pending upon the institutional arena in which they 
are raised. Using pesticides as an illustration, the ag-
riculture committee in Congress is more likely to 
view pesticides as a method to increase farmers? prof-
its, while an environmental group is more likely to fo-
cus on the negative health effects. In a transitional 
and developing country, policy images may also be 
affected by the development strategy and social envi-
ronment.
China?s reform began in the countryside and 
achieved its initial success in 1984. From 1979 to 
1984, crops value increased 42.3%, with 19.8% specifi-
cally because of HRS.7 Following this, the CPC shift-
ed their attention from the countryside to cities and 
embarked on urban reform. One may question why 
policymakers chose to fund one issue rather than the 
other. Salisbury and Shepsle8 used a simple model to 
explore the answer to this question. The person in 
question might be an elected official, a lobbyist, or a 
staff member. The key element is that they must 
choose the issues on which to spend their time, re-
sources, and energy. They might prefer to work on 
issues that have a chance of success rather than on 
those that are not. This can also explain China?s rural 
land transfer policy. Land transfer was banned in the 
early stages of land reform in 1978 and was then per-
mitted in No. 1 files of 1984s. Though the transfer of 
rural land was allowed in the policy system, the land 
transfer market was kept nascent. Policymakers are 
bound by rationality, meaning they make policy deci-
sions in serial patterns. Under China?s transition, 
every development stage has different themes, such 
as emancipating the mind, seeking truth from the 
facts; efficiency comes first, balances fairness, and 
Scientific Outlook on Development. Guided by the 
principle of efficiency comes first, rural-urban bal-
anced development, with the protection of farmers? 
land right, was easily neglected. 
Policy side effects are an important factor in caus-
ing policy change. Boundary rational assumes that 
policymakers are only focused on one aspect, or one 
dimension of a policy, and are not able to consider all 
effects of policy, including side effects. However, 
when new attributes such as the side effect are sali-
ent, substantial change is possible. The Chinese gov-
ernment?s long-term strategy tends to give priority to 
the development of the urban economy, resulting in 
an increasing gap between the cities and countryside. 
In the meantime, HRS pushed the agricultural econo-
my back to a small-scale peasant economy, resulting 
in a number of unwanted rural labor force and reduc-
ing the scale effect of farming. Policymakers shifted 
to another aspect of the policy: how to change the 
policy to minimize the risk of side effects.
Changes in the social environment have brought 
about changes to the image of land transfer policy 
over the past 35 years. In the early era of reform, 
farmers who participated in contractual land ex-
change aimed to cultivate their land conveniently. 
Since the mid-1980s, numerous villages and township 
enterprises have sprung up, and a large percentage 
of agricultural labor became employed workers, caus-
ing massive arable land desertion. Contracted land 
became an unnecessary burden for farmers who 
worked in the township enterprises. To achieve their 
197
Hosei University Repository
assigned task of grain production, village collectives 
collected deserted land and transferred it to big pro-
duction households without charging rent. The result 
was a passive image of land transfer in the mid-1980s. 
With industrialization and urbanization came a 
change in the main source of farmers? incomes. Over 
26 million rural people worked in non-agricultural 
sectors with roughly 16 million migrant workers 
working outside their counties, and over three mil-
lion leaving their county with their entire family.9 The 
move into the cities resulted in the reduction of farm-
ing labor supply and the changing the role of land in 
farmer?s lives. Farmers not only live on the lands, but 
also participate in service, manufacturing, and other 
industries. A nationwide survey conducted by Rural 
Development Institute (RDI) in 2008 revealed that 
nearly 48% of respondents reported that over 80% of 
their cash income came from non-farming work.10 
The findings demonstrated that farmers could boost 
cash income by working outside of the farm. Consid-
ering the development paths of South Korea and Ja-
pan, the move from agricultural production to non-ag-
ricultural production was inevitable during 
urbanization. 
In China, however, this move had different mean-
ings. Due to the urban-rural dual system, farmers 
working in the cities had little chance to settle down 
and change their identity (hu kou). Agricultural mi-
grant workers were not able to enjoy essential public 
services like education, medical care, and nursing. 
As a result, the generation ranging in ages 18 to 45 
years often left their villages, driven by considerable 
revenue in cities; the elderly, women, and children 
remained in the countryside and become the main 
agricultural labor force. Along with the change of so-
cial environment and growing consciousness of ur-
ban-rural disparity, the image of land transfer 
changed for both policymakers and policy recipients. 
For farmers, contracted land became their most im-
portant asset because of urban expansion and relia-
ble unemployment insurance when they lost their 
jobs in the cities. For governments, rural land trans-
fer became the effective path to increase rural in-
comes, reduce rural-urban disparity, ensure food se-
curity, and maintain social stability. 
Conclusion
China?s rural land transfer policy has changed dra-
matically over the past several decades. After the re-
form, China?s rural land transfer policy underwent 
changes in three phases: (1) prohibited phase (1978–
1984); (2) permitted phase (1984–2002); and (3) en-
couraged phase (2002–present). In 2003, the agricul-
tural land transfer system was established. According 
to the Rural Land Contracting Law, land-use rights 
can be transferred through subcontract, rent, ex-
change, assignment, or other means. China?s land 
transfer changes can be explained using the punctu-
ated-equilibrium theory and by the interaction of poli-
cy venue and policy image. China is a unitary country 
under transition, rather than a stable and federal 
country. Thus, there are additional factors should be 
considered in the interaction of policy venue and poli-
cy image, such as the needs of farmers, the local in-
novation and central decision, and the related poli-
cies. Moreover, the social environment, development 
strategy, and policy side effects have an effect on the 
policy image, also leading to policy change.
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